Pseudorandomness is a classical model for the security of block ciphers. In this paper we propose convenient tools in order to study it in connection with the Shannon Theory, the Carter-Wegman universal hash functions paradigm, and the LubyRackoff approach. This enables the construction of new ciphers with security proofs under specific models. We show how to ensure security against basic differential and linear cryptanalysis and even more general attacks. We propose practical construction schemes.
Introduction
Conventional encryption is used in order to enforce confidentiality of communications in a network. Following the Kerckhoffs principles [34] , schemes are defined by three public algorithms: a key generation scheme, an encryption scheme, and a decryption scheme. Two parties willing to communicate confidentially can generate a private key which is used as a parameter for encryption and decryption. Here encryption and decryption are formalized as functions C and D, respectively, such that D(C(x)) = x for any message x.
In 1949 Shannon formalized the notion of secrecy [59] . He formally proved the unconditional security (in his security model) of the Vernam cipher which had been published in 1926 [71] . Unfortunately, this scheme happens to be quite expensive to implement for networking because the sender and the receiver need to be synchronized, and they need quite cumbersome huge keys. Shannon's result also proves that unconditional security cannot be achieved in a better (i.e. cheaper) way. For this reason, empirical security seemed to be the only efficient alternative, and all secret key block ciphers which have been publicly developed were considered to be secure until some researcher published a dedicated attack on it. Therefore research mostly advanced like a tennis game between designers and analysts.
In the 70s the U.S. Government used to be far ahead of academic research on cryptography. By releasing the Data Encryption Standard (DES) [1] without development rationales, this paradoxically boosted research on block ciphers as researchers were trying to reverse engineer or attack the design of DES. Real advances on the attack strategies on block ciphers were made in the early 90s when Biham and Shamir invented differential cryptanalysis and applied it against DES [7] - [10] . The best version of this attack can recover a secret key with a simple 2 47 -chosen plaintext attack. 1 Although this attack is heuristic, experiments confirmed the results. Biham and Shamir's attack was based on statistical cryptanalysis ideas which were later used by Gilbert and Chassé against another cipher [15] , [16] . Those ideas inspired Matsui who developed a linear cryptanalysis on DES [41] , [42] . This heuristic attack, which has been implemented, can recover the key with a 2 43 -known plaintext attack. Since then, many researchers tried to generalize and improve these attacks (see, for instance, [22] , [27] , [28] , [30] , [35] , [36] , [37] , [48] , [61] , [62] ), but the underlying ideas were quite the same.
The basic idea of differential cryptanalysis is to use properties like "if x and x are two plaintext blocks such that x = x ⊕ a, then it is likely that C(x ) = C(x) ⊕ b". 2 Then the attack is an iterated two-chosen plaintexts attack which consists in getting the encrypted values of two random plaintexts which verify x = x ⊕ a until the special event C(x ) = C(x) ⊕ b occurs. Similarly, linear cryptanalysis consists in using the probability Pr[C(x) ∈ H 2 /x ∈ H 1 ] for two given hyperplanes H 1 and H 2 . With the GF(2) -vector space structure, hyperplanes are half-spaces, and this probability should be close to 1/2. Linear cryptanalysis exploits the distance between this probability and 1/2 when it is large enough. More precisely, linear cryptanalysis is an incremental oneknown plaintext attack where we simply measure the correlation between the events [x ∈ H 1 ] and [C(x) ∈ H 2 ].
Cryptanalysis is not restricted to destructive purposes. It also has a positive side on which the analyst tries to prove the security of cryptographic schemes. Unlike the negative aspects which can be purely intuitive (there is no need for proving that an attack works if we can experiment it successfully), the positive aspects require more formal and systematic results.
Instead of breaking or proposing new encryption functions, Nyberg first formalized the notion of strength against differential cryptanalysis [50] . Similarly, Chabaud and Vaudenay formalized the notion of strength against linear cryptanalysis [12] . With this approach, we can study how to make internal computation boxes resistant against both attacks. This can be used in a heuristic way by usual active s-boxes counting tricks (e.g. see [22] , [23] ). This has also been used to construct the PURE cipher for which we can prove the security against both attacks (see [52] ), but in an unsatisfactory way which introduces some algebraic properties which lead to other attacks as shown by Jakobsen and Knudsen [26] . The Nyberg-Knudsen approach was later used by Matsui in practical block ciphers including MISTY and KASUMI [2] , [43] , [44] .
Another approach in order to study the security of block ciphers was introduced by Luby and Rackoff in 1988 3 [40] . They have shown how to formalize security by pseudorandomness and how to prove the security of the underlying DES constructionthe Feistel scheme [14] -provided that round functions are totally random. As for the Shannon result, this suffers from the expensive cost of random bits, and basically requires having an enormous private key. We can still use derandomization techniques, like the Carter-Wegman method [11] , [73] for sampling pairwise independent numbers. This leads us to the notion of decorrelation which enables measuring the pseudorandomness with small keys and studying how it protects against attacks.
Inspired by Carter and Wegman, we use simple primitives which we call NUT (for "n-Universal Transformation") since they are so cheap to implement. We propose construction methods for block ciphers that we call COCONUT (for "Cipher Organized with Cute Operations and NUT"), PEANUT (for "Pretty Encryption Algorithm with NUT"), and WALNUT (for "Wonderful Algorithm with Light NUT"). Our construction is based on a theory which mixes all previous results and happens to offer new ways of investigation for research on block ciphers.
Related Work
Several researchers concentrated on the positive side of cryptanalysis: security arguments. Usually block cipher designers try to upper bound the probability of the best differential or linear characteristics in ad hoc ways. Some results apply to multi-path characteristics like Nyberg-Knudsen [51] , [52] , Aoki-Ohta [3] , Keliher et al. [32] , [33] , and Park et al. [53] , [54] .
In another approach, Luby-Rackoff [39] and Maurer-Massey [45] studied the security of product ciphers.
One of our purpose is to quantify the security against ciphers when a limited number d of samples are available, starting from the seminal work Luby-Rackoff [40] related to Feistel schemes [14] . Some extensions investigated the security with higher values of d, e.g. [46] and [56] . Many other researchers have applied the same techniques to other schemes. (See, for instance, [19] , [24] , [25] , [31] , [47] and [49] .)
Our work studies provable security against specific models of attacks. We addressed basic differential and linear cryptanalysis and the more general model of iterated attacks which are based on a (low) specific number d of plaintext/ciphertext samples. Our work was further extended by Junod [29] with techniques using statistics.
Some papers related to the theory presented in this article are collected on [66] .
Structure of This Article
The paper is organized as follows. First we give some definitions on decorrelation (Section 2) and basic constructions for NUTs (Section 3). Then we investigate connections to Shannon's perfect secrecy notion (Section 4). We show how to express security results in the Luby-Rackoff security model (Section 5). We prove how pairwise decorrelation can protect a cipher against basic differential and linear cryptanalysis (Sections 6.1 and 6.2). We generalize those results with the notion of "iterated attacks of order d" (Section 6.3).
Then we apply decorrelation upper bounds to practical constructions such as Feistel ciphers (Section 7). Finally, we define the COCONUT, PEANUT, and WALNUT families (Section 8).
Notations
In what follows we use the following notations:
•: composition of two functions: f • g is a function which maps x onto f (g(x)), R: set of real numbers, GF(q): finite field with q elements, We represent all random variables by capital letters. They are associated to a probability distribution which will be clear from the context. For instance, X may denote a random variable and Pr[X = x] may represent the probability that it takes a given value x.
Given finite sets I and J , a real matrix A of type I × J is defined by an array of real numbers whose row indices and column indices run in I and J , respectively. We let R I×J denote the set of all these matrices. The term in row i and column j is denoted A i, j . In Section 2.4 four norms A 2 , N ∞ (A), |||A||| ∞ , and A a of the matrix A are defined.
Random functions or permutations will be considered. They will be represented by random variables, e.g. F or C. Section 2.1 defines the matrix [F] d or [C] d for any positive integer d. Random functions or permutations with "ideal" distributions will be denoted with a star superscript as F * or C * .
Decorrelation

Block Ciphers, Random Functions, Distribution Matrices
In what follows, we consider ciphers as random permutations C on a message-block space M. Since we are considering block ciphers, for simplicity reasons, messages are considered as elements of M, which is assumed to be a finite set. In most practical cases, we have M = {0, 1} m . We emphasize C being a random permutation. Here the randomness comes from the random choice of the secret key. In particular, for any (fixed) permutation c over M, there is a probability Pr[C = c] that the C instance is equal to c. Definition 1. Given a random function F from a given set M 1 to a given set M 2 and an integer d, we define the d-wise distribution matrix
2 is defined as the probability that we simultaneously have
Basically, each row of the d-wise distribution matrix corresponds to the distribution of the d-tuple (F(x 1 ) , . . . , F(x d )) where (x 1 , . . . , x d ) corresponds to the index of the row. Intuitively, every experiment (or attack) on C with d samples will provide some information on some simultaneous equations C(x i ) = y i . The experiment probability will thus correspond to a cell in the [C] d matrix.
Perfect Decorrelation
The A random function (or a random permutation) will be compared with an ideal version of it which will have to be specified. Then we will be able to compare the decorrelations of the function (or permutation) and its ideal version. For example, a block cipher C over M is compared with the ideal block cipher C * over M which is defined to be a random permutation over M with uniform distribution. Saying that the function F has a perfect 2-wise decorrelation means that for any x 1 = x 2 the random variables F(x 1 ) and F(x 2 ) are uniformly distributed and independent. This is exactly the notion of strongly universal 2 function as defined by Wegman and Carter [73] .
Saying that a cipher C on M has a perfect 2-wise decorrelation means that for any x 1 = x 2 , the random variable (C(x 1 ), C(x 2 )) is uniformly distributed among all the (y 1 , y 2 ) pairs such that y 1 = y 2 . This is exactly the notion of pairwise independent permutation as defined by Wegman and Carter [73] .
Decorrelation Distance
The previous section provides a qualitative way to compare decorrelations. Here we introduce a quantitative way to do the same. Definition 2. Given two random functions F and G from a given set M 1 to a given set M 2 , an integer d and a distance D over the matrix space R 
Classical Distances
For the purpose of our treatment, we define the L 2 norm, the infinity weighted pseudonorm N ∞ , the L ∞ -associated matrix norm ||| · ||| ∞ , and the · a norm 4 
A a = max
We notice that
We similarly define π y 1 ,z 1 (B) and π x 1 ,z 1 (A × B). We have similar observations for B a and A × B a . Obviously we have
Using the triangular inequality and the induction hypothesis, we have
By considering matrices in R M 1 ×M 2 and R M 2 ×M 3 whose terms are the π x 1 ,y 1 (A) a and π y 1 ,z 1 (B) a values we notice that this expression is yet another ||| · ||| ∞ norm of a matrix product. Hence
We also recall properties of distances. A distance D is such that
D(A, B) = 0 if and only if
A = B, 2. D(A, B) = D(B, A), 3. D(A, C) ≤ D(A, B) + D(B, C).
Matrix norms define distances by D(A, B)
= A − B . We easily check that N ∞ defines a distance on distribution matrices of ciphers as well.
In [70] the · s norm is introduced. It is used in order to study super-pseudorandomness whereas · a is used in order to study randomness. For simplicity we omit it in the paper, but we put discussion of it in Appendix B.
Multiplicativity of Decorrelation Distances
Theorem 4. Let C 1 , . . . , C r be independent ciphers over M. We consider C = C r • · · · • C 1 the product cipher. We let C * be the perfect cipher over M. For the distance D defined by either
It will be shown that the distance D characterizes the weakness of a cipher. Hence this theorem means that the weakness is multiplicative in a product cipher. This property makes the decorrelation bias of ciphers a multiplicative combinatorial measurement for those distances. It is quite convenient to prove the amplification phenomenon in product ciphers.
Proof. By induction we only need to prove it for r = 2. Let C 1 and C 2 be two independent random permutations over M. We notice that [ 
We recall that the · 2 , ||| · ||| ∞ , and · a norms are matrix norms, i.e.
for those norms. We easily check that we have a similar property for the N ∞ distance.
Decorrelation Modules
The aim of this section is to provide cheap and efficient decorrelated random functions or permutations. We call them NUT, for n-Universal Transformations, in order to remind us of the Carter-Wegman notion of universal function and to emphasize their low cost.
NUT-0: Perfect 1-Wise Decorrelated Permutations over a Group
Perfect 1-wise decorrelation is easy to achieve with permutations when the messageblock space M is given a group structure. We let + denote the group law in M. We can use C(x) = x + K where K is a uniformly distributed random key on M, which is exactly the Vernam cipher [71] . This primitive plays an important role in the construction of block ciphers, e.g. in order to construct Markov ciphers (see [37] ) or in the NybergKnudsen construction [52] .
NUT-I: Perfect Decorrelated Functions over a Finite Field
Perfect decorrelated functions are easy to construct when M is given a finite field structure. We can take F(
This random function has perfect d-wise decorrelation due to the Lagrange interpolation principle. This builds perfect decorrelation functions to arbitrary orders. Perfect decorrelated permutations to arbitrary orders are much harder to construct.
NUT-II: Perfect Pairwise Decorrelated Permutations over a Finite Field
We can construct perfect pairwise decorrelated ciphers on a field structure M as well by
NUT-III: Modulo p -Based Pairwise Decorrelated Functions for the L 2 Norm
On the standard space M = {0, 1} m , our previous construction requires implementing arithmetic on the finite field GF(2 m ), which may lead to a poor encryption rate on software for large m. We can take advantage of built-in integer multiplication by approximating the previous construction. The decorrelation is no longer perfect though.
The proof is given in [65] . Note that the pairwise ||| · ||| ∞ -decorrelation of this primitive is pretty bad since the distribution of (F(
We can however use this primitive in order to amplify the decorrelation of random cipher in the sense of the L 2 norm and still obtain provable security bounds.
NUT-IV: Modulo p -Based Decorrelated Functions for the · a Norm
Here instead of taking p smaller than 2 m as in the previous construction, we take p larger than 2 m .
Theorem 6. Let F(x)
This theorem generalizes to any finite field GF( p) with p not necessarily prime, and any M when using any injective representation from M to GF( p) for x and the K i 's and using any surjective mapping from GF( p) to M instead of the modulo 2 m reduction. (See Theorem 7 of [70] .)
The proof of this theorem requires materials from Section 5. We provide it in Appendix A.
Note that a similar construction has been previously used by Halevi and Krawczyk for authentication in the MMH algorithm [21] .
NUT-V: 3-Wise Decorrelated Permutations over a Finite Field
A similar way to construct (almost) perfect 3-wise decorrelated permutation on a field structure M is by
Links to the Shannon Secrecy Theory
Perfect Secrecy and Decorrelation
Shannon defines security by the notion of perfect secrecy [59] . Perfect secrecy is a property of a cipher and a random plaintext source. We say that C provides perfect secrecy for a given distribution of
where H denotes the Shannon entropy, 7 or equivalently if X and C(X ) have independent distributions. We can also consider ciphers C which provide perfect secrecy for any distribution of X . This means that the distribution of C(x) does not depend on x.
In Shannon's formalism, X denotes the full stream of plaintext that we want to encrypt whereas X denotes one plaintext block in our approach. We usually bring the two approaches together by considering C as a one-time cipher which encrypts a single plaintext (big) block.
Obviously, if C is a perfect 1-wise decorrelated cipher, then C provides perfect secrecy for any plaintext source since C(x) is uniformly distributed for any x. The Vernam cipher (see Section 3.1) is an example.
We easily capture the notion of a chosen plaintext or ciphertext attack with the following generalization.
Theorem 7. Let C be a cipher with a perfect d-wise decorrelation. For any x
1 , . . . , x d−1 , if X is a random variable such that X = x i , then H (X/C(x 1 ), . . . , C(x d−1 ), C(X )) = H (X ).
This means that if an adversary knows
is nothing more than knowing that it is different from all x i 's.
Proof. From the definitions, straightforward computations show that for any random variable X we have
. Since we know that our X is different from all x i we have p = 0.
Key Length Lower Bound
The Shannon approach enables proving a lower bound on the private key length for ciphers which achieve perfect secrecy for any plaintext source. More precisely, the Shannon theorem proves that if C provides perfect secrecy for any distribution of the plaintexts over M, then H (C) ≥ log 2 #M. This means that the key parameter in C 7 We recall that by definition
with the convention that 0 log 2 0 =
0, and that H (X/Y ) = H (X, Y ) − H (Y ) where H (X, Y ) is the entropy of the joint variable Z = (X, Y ).
needs to have at least log 2 #M bits to be at least as long as the plaintext. The Vernam cipher achieves the equality case. We can prove a similar result for perfect decorrelation.
Theorem 8. If F is a random function from
Due to the property of joint entropy we have
For ciphers we do the same. Y happens to be uniformly distributed among all multipoints with pairwise different entries. We have
The result then comes from log(1 − ε) = −ε − o(ε).
Security against Distinguishers with Limited Oracle Accesses
In the Luby-Rackoff model [40] , an attacker is an infinitely powerful Turing machine A O which has access to an oracle O. Her aim is to distinguish a cipher C from the perfect cipher C * by querying the oracle with a limited number d of inputs. The oracle O implements either C or C * . The attacker must finally answer 0 ("reject") or 1 ("accept"). We measure the ability to distinguish C from C * by the advantage Adv A = |p − p * | where p (resp. p * ) is the probability of accepting C (resp C * ), i.e. the probability of answering 1 if O implements C (resp. C * ).
d-Limited Distinguishers and N ∞ -Decorrelation
Since we put no upper bound on the computational capability of the distinguisher (the only limitation is on the number of queries to the oracle), we can assume without loss of generality that the best one is fully deterministic. Hence it can be defined by functions f 1 , . . . , f d and an acceptance set A as illustrated in Fig. 1 . Fig. 1) , we have
Theorem 9. Let d be an integer, and let C be a cipher. For any distinguisher between C and the perfect cipher C * which is limited to d queries (as depicted in
where the N ∞ norm is defined by (2) .
In particular, we have unconditional security when the decorrelation is perfect and we still have a proven quantified security when the decorrelation is small.
Proof. Obviously we have
where
so we have p − p * ≤ ε for any attacker. We can apply this result to the attacker which produces the opposite output to show that | p − p * | ≤ ε.
Best Non-Adaptive Distinguisher and ||| · ||| ∞ -Decorrelation
Here is a more precise theorem in the non-adaptive case. We call a distinguisher "nonadaptive" if no X i queried to the oracle depends on some previous answers Y j (see Fig. 2 ). Fig. 2) for C is such that
Theorem 10. Let d be an integer and let C be a cipher. The best d-limited non-adaptive distinguisher (as depicted in
where the ||| · ||| ∞ norm is defined by (3) and C * is the perfect cipher.
Proof. The best attack is fully characterized by x = (x 1 , . . . , x d ) and A. With the notations of Theorem 9, we have
thus, we have
Looking for the best distinguisher thus consists of maximizing this expression over all possible choices for x and A. We can easily see that this maximum is obtained when A
→ y] have the same sign. Since the full sum for all y is zero, the sum of all positive terms is equal to the sum of negative terms, hence half of the sum of all absolute values. Hence for the best distinguisher
We can recognize here the
Best Adaptive Distinguisher and · a -Decorrelation
We can extend Theorem 10 and get a more precise result than Theorem 9. Fig. 1) for C is such that
Theorem 11. Let d be an integer and let C be a cipher. The best d-limited distinguisher (as depicted in
where the · a norm is defined by (4) and C * is the perfect cipher.
This motivates the introduction of the · a norm.
Proof. The best attack is fully characterized by f 1 , . . . , f d and A. As for Theorem 10, for the optimal distinguisher we have 
Resistance against Iterated Attacks
Since resisting against general d-limited distinguishers for d large costs too many bits of randomness in the private keys (as Theorem 8 says), we can wonder how useful this theory is for practical ciphers. In this section we investigate some particular class of distinguishers which capture many of the existing attack methods. We show that decorrelation with low degree is enough to resist them.
Differential Cryptanalysis
In this section we assume that M is given a group structure of order M. (Typically we consider M = {0, 1} m and the XOR group law.) We study the security of pairwise decorrelated ciphers against basic differential cryptanalysis.
Let C be a cipher on M and let C * be the perfect cipher. Most differential cryptanalysis of r -round block ciphers based on the Biham and Shamir attack (see [9] and [10] ) use a simple distinguisher between r − i rounds (for i = 1, 2, or 3) of the cipher and the perfect cipher. This distinguisher uses a fixed pair (a, b) ∈ M 2 with a = 0 and is depicted in Fig. 3 . We define
where X has a uniform distribution. It is well known that differential cryptanalysis depends on this quantity (see, for instance, [50] ). This quantity depends on the choice of the cipher (i.e. on the key). Here we focus on average complexities of attacks with no prior information on the key. 8 For this we concentrate on the average value E(DP C (a, b) ), over the distribution of C. We first mention that E(DP C (a, b) ) has an interesting linear expression with respect to the pairwise distribution matrix of C. Namely, straightforward computation shows that
Lemma 12. For the distinguisher of Fig. 3 between C and the perfect cipher C * over the group M of order M we have a, b) ) .
Proof.
It is straightforward to see that the probability p c , for some fixed oracle c, that the attack accepts c is
which is less than n · DP c (a, b) . The probability that it accepts a, b) ). Since from (5) we have E(DP
, we obtain the result.
Theorem 13. Let C be a cipher on a group M of order M and let C * be the perfect cipher. For any basic differential distinguisher between C and C * (depicted in Fig. 3 ) of complexity n, we have
Note that this result holds for differential cryptanalysis with any group law and captures the notion of multi-path differential.
Proof. We first consider the distinguisher with n = 1. It is a non-adaptive distinguisher limited to two queries. Due to Theorem 10, this is less than
As in the proof of Lemma 12, we obtain that it is further equal to
We conclude by using Lemma 12.
So, if the pairwise decorrelation bias has the order of 1/M, basic differential cryptanalysis cannot work against C unless its complexity reaches the order of magnitude of M.
Linear Cryptanalysis
Linear cryptanalysis has been invented by Matsui [41] , [42] based on the notion of statistical attacks which are due to Gilbert and coworkers [15] , [16] , [60] . As for differential cryptanalysis, we study here the underlying distinguisher against r − i rounds for small i.
In this section we assume that M = {0, 1} m . The inner dot product a · b in {0, 1} m is the parity of the bitwise AND of a and b.
Parameters: a complexity n, a characteristic (a, b), a set A Oracle: a permutation c 1: initialize the counter value u to zero 2: for i from 1 to n do 3: pick a random X with a uniform distribution and query for c(X ) 4:
if X · a = c(X ) · b, increment the counter u 5: end for 6: if u ∈ A, output 1, otherwise output 0 Let C be a cipher on M and let C * be the perfect cipher. As in Section 6.1, we similarly call the basic linear distinguisher the distinguisher characterized by a pair (a, b) ∈ M 2 with b = 0 which is depicted in Fig. 4 . We notice here that the attack depends on the way it accepts or rejects, based on the final counter u value.
As pointed out by Chabaud and Vaudenay [12] , linear cryptanalysis is based on the quantity
(Here we use Matsui's notations taken from [43] .) As for differential cryptanalysis, we focus on E(LP C (a, b)), and there is a linear expression of this mean value in terms of the pairwise distribution matrix [C] 2 which comes from straightforward computations, as shown by the following lemma.
Lemma 14. Given a random permutation C over {0, 1}
m , for any a and b, we have
If C has a uniform distribution, a = 0, and
Proof. In order to prove it, we first notice that 2 Pr
, and we express LP C (a, b) as
where X 1 and X 2 are independent uniformly distributed random variables. We have
The contribution of terms for which x 1 = x 2 is equal to 2 −m . Considering that C is a permutation we can concentrate on x 1 = x 2 and y 1 = y 2 . Then we split the remaining sum into four groups depending on the two bits ( 2 be the sum of all probabilities for which the two bits are (b 1 , b 2 ), x 1 = x 2 , and y 1 = y 2 .
We have
Due to symmetry we have 0,1 = 1,0 . Furthermore, the sum of the four sums is 2 m (2 m − 1). Hence
0,1 , which leads to our second result. Computations when C is uniformly distributed are straightforward. Fig. 4 we let p c be the probability that the output is 1 given an oracle c. We let p 0 be the probability that it outputs 1 when the counter is incremented with probability 1 2 in each iteration instead of querying the oracle. We have
Lemma 15. For the distinguisher of
Furthermore, the maximum for
) when n increases and LP c (a, b) = o(1/n).
Proof. We first express the probability p c that the distinguisher accepts c. Let N i be the random variable defined as being 1 or 0 depending on whether or not we have X · a = c(X )·b in the ith iteration. All N i 's are independent and with the same 0-or-1 distribution. Let z be the probability that N i = 1. We also define θ = 2z − 1 = √ LP c (a, b). We thus want to prove that | p c − p 0 | ≤ 2θ √ n. We have
We would like to upper bound | p c − p 0 | over all possible A depending on z. Since z and 1 − z play a symmetric role we assume without loss of generality that z ≥ , the result is trivially true, so from now on we assume that z > 1 2 . Since z u (1 − z) n−u is an increasing function in terms of u we have
where k is the least integer u such that the difference in parentheses is non-negative, i.e.
Replacing u by n/2 in the same expression in parentheses we obtain a negative difference. Hence k ≥ (n + 1)/2. Similarly, replacing u by n · z, the expression in parentheses turns out to be an increasing function in terms of z which is 0 for z = 1 2
so the result holds. If n = 2, we have k ≥ 3 2 , thus k = 2 and
), so the result holds as well. We now concentrate on n ≥ 3. We use the following identity taken from [58] :
We obtain
thus
The maximum is obtained for t = (k − 1)/(n − 1), hence
We have 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 and
By using k n k = n n − 1 k − 1 and the Stirling approximation we obtain that this bound is asymptotically equal to θ √ n/ √ 2π, so the bound we want to prove is not so loose. We can easily prove that
For θ ≤ 1/2 √ 3 we obtain | p c − p 0 | ≤ 2θ √ n and this remains true even for θ > 1/2 √ 3. We now concentrate on n ≥ 4.
The n k term is upper bounded by n r with r = n/2 . Furthermore, we have n r
with equality when n is even. Then log n r
Now we have
We deduce
When θ √ n < 1 2 and n ≥ 4 we have (nθ
this also holds since the right-hand side of the inequality is greater than 1 and the left-hand side is a difference between two probabilities. This proves the upper bound.
By definition of k we have
, z]. From (7) we deduce
Since it is also smaller, this is indeed an equivalent.
Lemma 16. Let C be a cipher on M = {0, 1}
m . For any linear distinguisher (as depicted in Fig. 4 ) between C and the ideal cipher C * we have
Proof. We first notice that the advantage is zero when a = 0 or b = 0, so the bound holds. Let us now assume that a = 0 and b = 0. We now take a random permutation C with the corresponding Z and p C as in the previous lemma.
Since (2Z − 1) 2 is positive, the probability that |2Z − 1| is greater than α is less than δ/α 2 . Hence
We now fix α = (
We recall that δ = E(LP C (a, b) ). Since a = 0 and b = 0, we note that E(LP
m − 1 from Lemma 14 so we can have
We finally use that | p − p * | ≤ |p − p 0 | + |p * − p 0 |.
Theorem 17. Let C be a cipher on M = {0, 1}
m . For any linear distinguisher (as depicted in Fig. 4 ) between C and the ideal cipher C * of complexity n we have
Proof. Actually we have E(LP
from Lemma 14. We conclude by using the previous lemma.
So, if the pairwise decorrelation bias has the order of 2 −m , linear distinguishers cannot work against C unless its complexity reaches the order of magnitude of 2 m .
Non-adaptive iterated attacks of order d
Theorems 13 and 17 suggest that we try to generalize them to distinguishers in the model depicted in Fig. 5 as proposed in [67] . In this model we iterate a d-limited nonadaptive distinguisher T . We assume that this distinguisher obtains a sample (X, Y ) with Parameters: a complexity n, a distribution on X , a test T , a set A Oracle: a permutation c 1: for i from 1 to n do 2:
set T i = 0 or 1 with an expected value T (X, Y ) 5: end for 6: if (T 1 , . . . , T n ) ∈ A output 1 otherwise output 0 One may believe that a cipher is resistant to this model of distinguisher once it has a small d-wise decorrelation bias. This is wrong as the following example shows. Let C be a cipher with a perfect d-wise decorrelation. We assume that an instance c of C is totally defined by d points (x i , y i ) so that C is uniformly distributed in a set of
for a given modulus µ = n/a and
If we feed this attack with C or C * , we have
for a n, respectively. Thus Adv can be large even with a relatively large n. This problem actually comes from the fact that the tests T provide a same expected result for C and C * but a totally different standard deviation. As a more concrete counterexample we can consider C as the NUT-II decorrelation module over M = GF(2 m ) which achieves perfect decorrelation to the order d = 2. We can consider a kind of differential-linear attack as an iterated attack of order d = 2 which queries random pairs (X 1 , X 2 ) with a fixed difference X 1 ⊕ X 2 = a and take T i equal to one bit b · (c(X 1 ) ⊕ c(X 2 )). Then we take A = {(0, . . . , 0), (1, . . . , 1)}. Due to the NUT-II structure, T i is a constant bit thus p = 1, but p * ≈ 2.2 −m so the advantage of the distinguisher is close to 1. This simple example extends into a real attack due to Biham et al. [6] against the COCONUT98 cipher [64] .
We can however prove the security when the cipher has a good decorrelation to the order 2d and an extra assumption about the distribution of X in every iteration. Note that this extra assumption on δ makes sense when considering either known plaintext attacks or chosen plaintext attacks with a sufficiently large sample space. For instance, if the distribution of X is uniform, we
Proof. Let Z (resp. Z * ) be the probability that the test accepts (X, C(X )) (resp. (X, C * (X ))), i.e.
Z = E X (T (X, C(X ))).
Let p (resp. p * ) be the probability that the attack accepts, i.e.
Since the T i are independent and with the same expected value Z which only depends on C, we have
This can be written
. Obviously the advantage p − p * is maximal when all a i are either 0 or n i depending on the distributions of Z and Z * . This proves that we can assume an iterated attack to have an acceptance set A of the form
The full sum over i = 0, . . . , n is the derivative of the binomial expansion of (x +(1−x)) n which is 1. Hence the full sum is zero. We deduce that
Since i ≤ n we have
we deduce that | f (x)| ≤ 2n. Since x and 1 − x play a symmetric role we
The crucial point in the proof is in proving that |Z − Z * | is small within a high probability. For this, we need |E(Z ) − E(Z * )| and |V (Z ) − V (Z * )| both to be small. From Theorem 10 we know that |E(Z ) − E(Z * )| ≤ ε/2. We note that Z 2 corresponds to another test but with 2d entries, namely,
ε. Now from the Tchebichev's inequality we have
We separate values of z and z * for which we have |z − E(Z )| ≤ λ and |z * − E(Z * )| ≤ λ from others and we get
+ nε.
Now we have
The sum over all x and x entries with colliding entries (i.e. with some x i = x j ) is less than δ. The sum over all y and y entries with colliding entries and no colliding x and x is less than d 2 /4M. The sum over all no colliding x and x and no colliding y and y is equal to
This theorem proves that we need n = (1/ √ ε) or n = ( √ M) to have a meaningful iterated attack. If we apply it to linear cryptanalysis, this result is thus weaker than Theorem 17. It is however much more general.
Note that Theorem 18 could be extended with no assumption on δ and with adaptive attacks as long as we upper bound V (Z * ).
Block Cipher Constructions
In the previous sections we have seen that it is enough to achieve a good decorrelation of low degree in order to resist many practical attack models. Here we show how to construct practical ciphers with those properties.
Decorrelation of Feistel Ciphers
In this section we assume that M = M 0 2 where M 0 is a group. Thus we can consider Feistel ciphers on M. We recall the notation for Feistel schemes. Given functions f 1 , . . . , f r over M 0 we define
Lemma 19 [40] . Let F 1 , F 2 , F 3 be three independent uniformly distributed random functions on M 0 and let d be an integer. We consider the cipher C = (F 1 , F 2 , F 3 ) Fig. 6. Feistel scheme ( f 1 , f 2 , f 3 ) . 
Thus from Theorem 11 we have
The decorrelation · a -bias of Feistel ciphers can be estimated with the following lemma. Let F 1 , . . . , F r (resp. R 1 , . . . , R r ) be r independent random functions on
Lemma 20.
Using the triangular inequality we have
Let us prove that 
By using Theorem 10, this lemma, the Luby-Rackoff lemma, and the multiplicativity of decorrelation distances, we obtain the following result.
Theorem 21. Let F 1 , . . . , F r be r independent random functions on M 0 such that 
We note that the result holds for practical Feistel schemes as long as rounds use independent subkeys and that we can measure the decorrelation biases of round functions.
Proof. By using the simulation technique as in the lemma, we notice that the · adecorrelation bias can only decrease with the number of rounds. Hence the decorrelation bias of a k-round Feistel scheme is at most kε + 2d 2 / √ #M. Next we use the multiplicativity of the · a -decorrelation bias r/k times. We may have a few extra rounds, but this can only make the decorrelation bias decrease. We finally use Theorem 11.
We mention that there is a similar result for the · 2 norm in [65] .
Generalization
The construction of decorrelated Feistel schemes based on the Luby-Rackoff theorem generalizes to arbitrary structures. We provide here a useful lemma taken from [68] which was freely adapted from Patarin's "coefficient H techniques" [55] . 
This lemma intuitively means that if [F] 
Proof.
We use the characterization of · a -decorrelation bias in terms of best adaptive distinguisher by using Theorem 11. We let A be one d-limited distinguisher between F and F * with maximum advantage. We can assume without loss of generality that A is deterministic and never sends the same query twice. The behavior of A is thus deterministically defined by the oracle responses y = (y 1 , . . . , y d ) . We let x i denote the ith query defined by y 1 , . . . , y i−1 . We let x = (x 1 , . . . , x d ) , which is assumed to be in X . We let A be the set of all rejected y i , i.e. for which A outputs 0. It is straightforward that
Next we have
The first sum is upper bounded by ε 2 . For the second sum, we recall that all
x,y is always equal to p 0 . This sum is thus less than ε 1 .
As a first application, here is a quite useful lemma.
Lemma 23. For a random uniformly distributed function F * and a random uniformly distributed permutation C
* defined over {0, 1} m , we have
Proof. We use Lemma 22 with F = C * . We let Y be equal to the set of all pairwise different outputs. We have
x,y ≥ p 0 , we can take ε 2 = 0 and apply Lemma 22.
As an example of application we prove Lemma 19 in a few lines.
Proof of Lemma 19. Following the Feistel scheme
we let
We let E be the event that z
(This is a set of non-pathological outputs when computing [C] 
which we define to be 1 − ε 2 . We thus obtain from Lemma 22 that
. From this and Lemma 23 we thus obtain
Since · a is always less than 2, it also holds for larger d.
This technique can be used for various applications. For instance, we can compare the decorrelation provided by top-level schemes of the candidates to the AES standardization process. This has been done in [47] . It was also applied to the Lai-Massey scheme (the construction of IDEA [36] ) in [69] . This is used in Section 8.3.
Construction Examples
COCONUT: A Perfect Decorrelation Design
In this section we define the COCONUT ciphers family which are perfectly decorrelated ciphers to the order 2. It uses the NUT-II decorrelation module.
The COCONUT ciphers are characterized by some parameters (m, p) where m is the block length, and p is an irreducible polynomial of degree m in GF(2) (which defines a representation of the GF(2 m ) Galois Field). A COCONUT cipher of block length m is simply a product cipher C 1 • C 2 • C 3 where C 1 and C 3 are any (possibly weak) ciphers which can depend on each other, and C 2 is an independent cipher based on a 2m-bit key which consists of two polynomials A and B of degree at most m −1 over GF (2) such that A = 0. For a given representation of polynomials into m-bit strings, we simply define
C 2 is thus the NUT-II decorrelation module.
Since C 2 performs perfect decorrelation to the order 2 and since it is independent from C 1 and C 3 , any COCONUT cipher is obviously perfectly decorrelated to the order 2. Therefore Theorems 13 and 17 show that COCONUT resists basic differential and linear cryptanalysis.
One can wonder what C 1 and C 3 are for. Actually, C 2 makes some classes of attacks provably impractical, but in a way which makes the cipher obviously weak against other attacks. (C 2 is actually a linear function, thus although we can prove it resists any attack with a parameter d ≤ 2, it is fairly weak against some attacks with d = 3.) We believe that all real attacks on any real cipher have an intrinsic order d: that is, they use the d-wise correlation in the encryption of d messages. Attacks with a large d on real ciphers are naturally impractical, because the d-wise decorrelation can hardly be analyzed since it depends on too many factors. Therefore, the COCONUT approach consists in making the cipher provably resistant against attacks of order at most 2 such as differential or linear cryptanalysis, and heuristically secure against attacks of higher order by real life ciphers such as C 1 and C 3 .
Example 24. The COCONUT98 cipher has been proposed in [64] with parameters m = 64 and p = x 64 + x 11 + x 2 + x + 1. Interestingly, this motivated Wagner to invent the "boomerang attack" [72] in order to break it. This attack is an iterated attack of order 4 which uses pretty bad differential properties of C 1 and C 3 . Another attack was found by Biham et al. [6] based on a non-adaptive iterated attack of order 2 (namely, a differential-linear attack, see Section. 6.3). This shows that despite the COCONUT98 cipher provably resisting any differential distinguisher as depicted in Fig. 3 , one must not neglect the intrinsic strength of C 1 and C 3 . The existence of attacks when using stronger C 1 and C 3 is still an open problem.
For completeness, we mention that an extension of the COCONUT construction (called DONUT for "Double Operations with NUT") was proposed by Cheon et al. [13] .
PEANUT: A Partial Decorrelation Design
In this section we define the PEANUT ciphers family, which achieve an example of partial decorrelation. This family is based on the NUT-IV decorrelation module.
The PEANUT ciphers are characterized by some parameters (m, r, d, p). They are Feistel ciphers with a block length of m bits (m even) and r rounds. The parameter d is the order of partial decorrelation that the cipher performs, and p must be a prime number greater than 2 m/2 . The cipher is defined by a key of mrd/2 bits which consists of a sequence of r lists of d (m/2)-bit numbers, one for each round. In each round, the F function has the form
where g is any permutation on the set of all (m/2)-bit numbers. From Theorem 21 with k = 3 we thus obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 25. Let C be a cipher in the PEANUT family with parameters (m, r, d, p).
We have . Therefore from Theorems 13 and 17 no differential or linear distinguisher can be efficient. The PEANUT98 cipher has been proposed with these parameters in [64] .
Example 27. In an earlier version of this work [63] , we proposed a similar construction (called PEANUT97) based on the NUT-III decorrelation module which uses prime numbers smaller than 2 m/2 . However, the result above does not hold with the · a norm, but rather with the · 2 one. The drawback is that this norm has less friendly theorems for constructing Feistel ciphers, and in particular we need more rounds to make the cipher provably secure. (See [65] .) Example 28. The AES candidate DFC was proposed based on the PEANUT construction (see [17] , [18] , and [20] 
WALNUT: An Alternate Design
The Feistel cipher is based on a round mapping defined by
The Feistel scheme benefits from the Luby-Rackoff lemma which enables building a PEANUT cipher with a provably low decorrelation bias. Instead, we can use the LaiMassey scheme on which IDEA relies and which is based on the round mapping
as illustrated by Fig. 7 where + is any group addition law, − is the corresponding subtraction, and O is an orthomorphism for the group, i.e. a permutation such that x → O(x) − x is also a permutation. As shown in [69] , the Luby-Rackoff lemma holds for this scheme as well with the same bound and same number of rounds. We can thus construct the WALNUT cipher is the same way as the PEANUT cipher, but with the Lai-Massey scheme instead of the Feistel one.
Conclusion and Further Work
Decorrelation modules are cheap and friendly tools which can strengthen the security of block ciphers. Actually, we can quantify their security against a class of cryptanalysis which includes differential and linear cryptanalysis. To illustrate this paradigm, we proposed prototype ciphers PEANUT97 [63] , COCONUT98 and PEANUT98 [64] , and DFCv2 [20] . One problem with the COCONUT, PEANUT, or WALNUT constructions is that they require a long key (in order to make the internal random functions independent). In real-life examples we can generate this long key by using a pseudorandom generator fed with a short key, but the results on the security based on decorrelation are no longer valid. However, provided that the pseudorandom generator produces outputs which are indistinguishable from truly random sequences, we can still prove the security. This approach has been developed in [17] , [18] , and [20] with the submission of DFC to the Advanced Encryption Standard process.
Security against some other generic models of attacks is still open. In particular, we may investigate security against the Boomerang attack [72] , the rectangle attack [5] , or the linear-differential attack [6] , [38] . Although we can directly use results from Section 6.3 with a high order of decorrelation it is not quite clear at this time what the minimal order of decorrelation required is. Extensions of Theorem 18 to adaptive attacks is also open. It is further not quite sure that 2d-decorrelation is necessary for getting provable security against iterated attacks of order d, although we have proven it is sufficient and that d-decorrelation is not.
It is further problematic to estimate the decorrelation bias of concrete ciphers like DES or AES candidates unless we approximate them to an ideal model [47] .
Fabrice Noilhan, Thomas Pornin, Guillaume Poupard, Jacques Stern, and from [4] and [47] , Kazumaro Aoki and Shiho Moriai. Lemma 30 [68] . 
The consequence is the following equivalent of Theorem 21.
Theorem 32 [70] . 
